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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, increased globalization of markets and the speed of
information dissemination and processing have madejoint ventures, strategic
alliances, and other forms of competitor (or "horizontal") collaboration'
more frequent and more essential. Whether in the form of loose "strategic
alliances" or formal joint ventures, the economic appeal - and procompetitive
potential - of such collaborations is manifest: they permit the kind of
specialization of function and economies of scale that are otherwise available
only through larger aggregations of capital and talent, such as result from
mergers. Thus, they permit smaller players to compete more effectively
against giants. In contrast to mergers, competitors who "joint venture"
remain competitors in all other aspects of their business; they thus create a
blend of cooperation and competition in ways not encountered under
ordinary competitive conditions. But, competitor collaboration has the face
J.D. 1970, Northwestern University; Partner, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago; Senior
Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law.
I
Except as otherwise indicated by context, "joint venture" and "strategic alliance" are used
interchangeably as examples of "competitor" or "horizontal" collaborations. The discussion'throughout
isofsuch "horizontal" ventures; some vertical collaborations raise much less antitrust concern, and others
not at all. Seegenerally, Antitrust Guidelinesfor CollaborationsAmong Competitors, issued in April.2000 by the
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division ("Collaboration
Guidelines"). The CollaborationGuidelines are summarized in Appendix A. While the focus of this article
is on U.S. competition law, a brief summary of European treatment of joint ventures is contained in
Appendix B.
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ofJanus; precisely because it blends cooperation and competition, it carries
within itself the seeds of both procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive
dangers.
This article, for the benefit of the corporate lawyer who is not an
antitrust specialist, aims to provide basic guidance as to the legal parameters
of competitor collaboration.' The stakes for understanding those limits are
high. The antitrust laws of the United States prohibit any "contract,
combination or conspiracy... in restraint of trade."2 The hard core of
antitrust law, backed up by criminal sanctions including prison terms for
executives, is the prohibition against agreements between competitors,
whether explicit or tacit, setting the prices they will charge, establishing the
output they will produce, dividing markets between them, or otherwise
coordinating their sales and marketing functions. These are the decisions
and activities on which competition is expected and required; cooperation is
forbidden.
A. Fundamentals of the Antitrust Perspective
The objective of the antitrust laws is the enhancement of productive
efficiency. Competition is essential to consumer welfare through that
objective. Without the spur of competition, goods and services will be
produced inefficiently, which is to say that more than the necessary amount
of scarce social and economic resources (like talent and capital) will be
absorbed in the enterprise, leaving less to serve other social needs. Without
competition, even an efficiently run business will benefit only the officers,
employees, and stockholders of the company, not consumers though lower
prices and better quality. With vigorous competition, both efficiency
(including a reasonable return to stockholders) and consumer welfare are
served.
Market power, the archenemy of competition, is the ability of a seller
profitably to raise prices above the competitive level. An absolute monopolist
has maximum market power, but appreciable market power can also exist in
companies who have less than all of a market. Here is how it works. In a
competitive market (in which no seller has market power), a seller who raises
its prices above the competitive level will be punished and forced to roll back
its prices, because its loss of unit sales will more than offset its gain in perunit price, so gross revenues will decline. A seller with market power, who
prices above the competitive level, on the other hand, will increase its gross
revenues, despite the loss of unit sales. Indeed, its market power will make

2

15 U.S.C. S 1(2000).
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it possible (and thus desirable) to reduce output in order to raise prices and
increase gross revenues.
Reducing the number of competitors, by horizontal merger or even by
horizontal joint venture, presents at least the risk of reducing competition.
In a merger, the reduction (by one) of the number of competitors is
permanent and cuts across all product lines in which they competed. In a
joint venture, the reduction is not permanent and typically covers less than
the entire product line, so in that sense is less threatening to competition.
Ironically, however, in other ways, the joint venture could be more menacing
than a merger; of which more later.
A merger, in reducing (by one) the number of competitors in a market,
necessarily increases the level of concentration in that market. Beyond a
certain point, an increase in concentration may give rise to market power and
an increase in anticompetitive risk.3 This may occur in two ways, both of
which are discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S.
Department ofJustice (Antitrust Division) and Federal Trade Commission
("Merger Guidelines").4 First, an increase in concentration may give the new
combined company (or others remaining in the market), the unilateral ability
to raise prices above the competitive level and profit by it. This is because
(everything else equal) the greater the market share of a firm, the greater is
its ability (and thus temptation) to reduce its individual output and cause a
price rise in the entire market. This is central to the feared "unilateral
effects" that may result from an increase in concentration.' In addition, there
may be "jointeffects" as the market becomes more concentrated with fewer
players, explicit or tacit collusion among sellers becomes easier.6
Ajoint venture or other collaboration between competitors is, ofcourse,
not a merger. However, depending on the number of products affected and
the duration of the arrangement, it may have the same concentrating effects
as a merger-at least as to those product lines and for that period of time.
Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission and Department ofJustice have said
in the Collaboration Guidelines that, where a horizontal collaboration is

3
The correlation between increased concentration and anticompetitive effects is much debated
in the economic literature. There is no question that the correlation is very imperfect, because instances
abound of markets with only two or three sellers, but fierce competition nonetheless. On the other hand,
there is ample evidence that in many industries, the march toward smaller and smaller numbers of
competitors will, at a certain point (and the point is industry-specific), result in supracompetitive pricing.
Much has to do with economies of scale and minimum efficient size, and these will vary greatly from
industry to industry and market to market.
4
57 Fed. Reg. 41552-01 (1992) ("Merger Guildlines").
s
Id. at S 2.2.
6
Id. at S 2.1.
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complete as to a particular market and not limited to less than ten years, they
will analyze it under the Merger Guidelines.7
Even where a joint venture or other collaboration is limited to less than
ten years, or does not eliminate all competition between the venturers in a
relevant market, it remains the fact that in some respects, a collaboration may
present more of an anticompetitive danger than a complete merger. A merger, to be sure, eliminates competition between the merging partners for all
times and all products, which collaboration typically does not. On the other
hand, the merged companies will be under common direction and management, and thus will have the ability to be a tougher, sharper competitor than
the two companies separately could have been. In addition, many economies
are correlated positively with increased size, with the result that the combined company may be more efficient than before. The result is the creation
of a stronger competitor in the marketplace-and, assuming strong postmerger competition in the market, one that will be spurred to pass on to
consumers the efficiencies and benefits of the merger in the form of lower
prices and better quality and service. These are obviously significant procompetitive benefits that offset the anticompetitive concerns of an increase
in concentration, and result in many horizontal mergers being approved.
Ajoint venture or horizontal collaboration, on the other hand, does not
involve a complete integration of assets; nor does it result in one stronger,
more focused competitor under central direction and discipline. Efficiencies
may result, but at a more modest level. Because ajoint venture involves only
a partial integration of assets and resources, has only limited objectives for a
finite period of time, and deals with management and control emanating
from at least two centers of power (the owners), it does not present the same
clear menu of procompetitive benefits.
There is one other difference. Everyone knows that the merged
companies will no longer compete with each other; that is inherent in the
merger, and factored into the antitrust analysis, at the time the deal is done.
On the other hand, joint venturers are supposed to remain competitors
outside the parameters of the joint venture. Competitors are not supposed
to talk to each other very much; and certainly not about prices or future
marketing. If they do, an agreement between them may be inferred and
serious, even criminal, consequences may ensue. Yet, as joint venturers,
these competitors are expected to cooperate, to talk and plan jointly. How
to carry out the joint venture without providing a venue for collusive
information exchanges on other products? The most important way is to
ensure that the personnel working in thejoint venture are separate from, and

CollaborationGuidelines, supra note 1, at S 1.3.
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do not communicate with, the personnel running the competitive lines of
business. The higher the firewall the better; if the joint venture is a separate
corporation with its own staff and employees, ideally located in separate
offices and facilities, that provides maximum protection. Even short of that,
there need to be clear lines of authority separating the functions of joint
venture personnel from personnel of the still-competing businesses, with
absolute prohibitions on communication concerning prices and marketing.
Antitrust counsel can set up organizational and functional firewalls,
educational and enforcement mechanisms, and audits to ensure that the
separation "on paper" is a separation in the real world. The avoidance of
"spillover effects" from a collaborative arrangement to the still-competing
spheres of the collaborators' businesses is essential. If it is not avoided, a
joint venture or competitor collaboration will be treated as a mere cover for
a cartel, which is per se illegal and subject to criminal prosecution.'
All of that said, it still remains that horizontal joint ventures, properly
organized and insulated from the competitive businesses of the co-venturers,
have many procompetitive benefits. In large measure, they are the same
benefits as those of a merger of competitors, the difference being one of
degree. Indeed, merger analysis and collaboration analysis ask fundamentally
the same questions: What effects will the arrangement have in the relevant
market? Will it enhance or undercut opportunities for the exercise of market
power? What will be the result for consumers? Do the procompetitive
effects (including efficiencies) outweigh the anticompetitive potential?
B. The Benefits of Competitor Collaboration
Perhaps the most important procompetitive result of joint ventures is
that they can give small sellers the ability to compete better against big sellers
(and thus perhaps eliminate the need to merge at all). By combining forces,
co-venturers can spread costs and risks, achieve economies of scale,
specialize, make significant technological investments, and in general,
emulate many of the advantages oftheir bigger, fully integrated rivals. Thus,
it is hardly surprising that competitors are creating joint ventures or strategic
alliances to engage jointly in research, product design, production
manufacturing, purchasing, and even marketing and selling. The functions
ofjoint buying and joint selling are especially well adapted to "B2B" website
marketplaces, a subject that will be discussed in detail later.
In a sense, cooperation (in some respects) coexisting with competition
(in other respects) is nothing new-nor is the observation that in many
8

Id. at

S 1.2.
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Thus,
fields, cooperation is the very precondition to competition.
competition among major league sports franchises depends entirely on their
cooperation with regard to, e.g., the rules of the game and the scheduling of
contests. 9 As far back as the Nineteenth Century, competition among
railroads would have been severely hampered had they not adopted uniform
track sizes for their rolling stock. Indeed, all forms of public transportation
require elaborate cooperation among providers in, for example, sharing
passenger terminals and facilities. With the advent of high-technology
products and enhanced "network effects," cooperation among competitors
becomes even more essential. Thus, it is in the interests of consumers (and
of competition) that makers of DVDs and CDs agree on a single operating
standard, so consumers can play the different products on a single player.
Computer users do not want a variety of "platforms" for software,
undercutting the compatibility of various end-use programs available for sale
and use.
These are all procompetitive uses of cooperation among competitors.
The key is making sure that competitors cooperate only where cooperation
enhances their competition, compete otherwise, and have a fairly clear idea
of where the line is drawn.
I. THE BUSINESS TO BUSINESS MARKETPLACE WEBSITE

In many ways, the paradigm of the "new cooperation" in which
competitors engage is the business-to-business website marketplace ("B2B").
As the name implies, B2Bs create a market in cyberspace where businesses
can buy their inputs or sell their outputs, not to consumers, but to other
businesses along the vertical chain that leads eventually to the consumer.
Sometimes a B2B is owned independently of the buyers and sellers who
utilize it, and this independence reduces antitrust concerns. Often, however,
it is owned jointly by buyers and sellers who transact business at the website
and compete against each other in the market for the sale of their goods.
These web-based marketplaces have become an important feature of a
number of important industries, including the automotive, aerospace/
defense, electronics, energy, oil, telecommunications, food and beverage,
rubber, and a variety of other industries. Their potential procompetitive
benefits are manifest: lower transaction costs (including administrative costs
of sellers and search costs of buyers), standardized parts and modules,
improved supply chain management, and broader participation, on an equal
footing, by market participants large and small.

9

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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What, then, are the antitrust concerns? Essentially, they are the same
concerns there always are with respect tojoint ventures between competitors,
with an overlay owing to a special characteristic of horizontally-owned B2B
sites: the B2B joint venture creates a marketplace in which others are invited
to (or may need to) compete. It is, in effect, a "platform" for further
competition and cooperation. Furthermore, because the value of the website
increases as more and more sellers or buyers participate, it displays "network
effects" that both encourage cooperation and, ultimately, may threaten
competition, by making the B2B, if not the only game in town, at least an
essential marketing facility for players in that industry. In other words, it
may gain market power as a marketplace. Against this background, the FTC
conducted a public workshop and study ofB2Bs,' ° in which antitrust dangers
were grouped into three broad categories. Other commentators have
generally followed a similar division ofissues.1' To understand the categories
of concern is to be alert to how they may be managed. The three categories
are: issues of inclusion and exclusion, problems of information-sharing and
special issues with joint buying.
A. B2B Inclusion and Exclusion
Who is included and who is excluded (as well as how and why) is of little
concern when the B2B is young and not very powerful. So long as there are
significant alternative channels for doing business (including both other
B2Bs and non-B2B "conventional" marketplaces), there is unlikely to be
competitive harm in being excluded from a particular B2B. As the B2B
grows, however, the likelihood increases that those not allowed to participate
will suffer genuine competitive harm, by virtue of being denied access to the
playing field (or at least an "essential" playing field) where the game is played.
At that point, the B2B itself has market power, and the exclusion of
newcomers may be truly anticompetitive. The Collaboration Guidelines
provide an absolute safe harbor where a joint venture accounts for 20% or
less of the relevant market, i.e., in the case of a competitor-owned B2B, a
"marketplace market share" of where it accounts for no more than 20% of
market transactions.12 At some point beyond 20%, however, significant
competitive concerns could arise.

to

"Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World ofB2B Electronic Marketplaces:

A Report by the Federal Trade Commission Staff," October 2000 ("FTC Report"). The public workshop
was conducted in June 2000.
11
See, e.g., articles collected in Vol. 15 Antitrust Magazine: "Inside the Internet Bazaar: B2B
Exchanges" (Fall 2000).
12
CollaborationGuidelines,supra note 1, at S 4.2.
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How to minimize the antitrust concerns? First, as noted above, if the
B2B is owned and controlled independently of the competitors, the danger
of anticompetitive uses of market power is greatly reduced; at a minimum,
the B2B has economic incentives to maximize its own utility as a
marketplace, without regard to the specific interests of specific participants.
(This is not to ignore the anticompetitive possibilities of pressure from big
participants, or outright agreements between powerful participants and the
B2B, which is why genuine independence is the touchstone.)
Even if the B2B is a joint venture of competitors, however, there are
reasonable steps to minimize antitrust dangers. The rules of inclusion and
exclusion should be uniform, public, and neutral-and based on
economically and rationally defensible criteria. An open marketplace-one
with no upper limit on participants-is obviously to be preferred where
feasible. Maximum practical access to newcomers, subject to reasonable
regulations and controls, is a good rule.
Despite the suggestions of the last paragraph, is there a point where a
B2B could become such a powerful marketplace that the taking on of new
participants could endanger the viability of other, competing marketplaces,
including other B2Bs, and could this be a competitive concern? Possibly so;
this is the problem of"overinclusion," and should be analyzed forjust these
dangers by antitrust counsel, as the "marketplace market share" of the B2B
becomes truly significant-say 50% or more. Yet even here, great care must
be taken before deciding to limit new participants-since this is the very
same range of B2B size, importance and market power where the exclusion
or limitation of new members (even for the procompetitive purpose of
avoiding monopoly status of the B2B) could have the anticompetitive effect
of endangering the viability of excluded new participants as competitors in
the sale of the downstream products. So even here, limitations on
membership or new membership must be approached very carefully.
Without getting to the point of limiting new members, however, there
are less drastic steps a B2B can take to avoid unnecessarily hindering the
development of rival marketplaces. Basically, the B2B (once it is a viable and
established marketplace) should minimize or avoid rules or incentives for its
members to participate exclusively with itself. Thus, prohibitions on
investment in or trading on other or competing B2Bs, high minimum
volume or percentage volume requirements that might have the same effect,
or excessive volume-based rebates or revenue-sharing arrangements should
be scrutinized carefully. Whether they can be justified as necessary B2Bboosting devices, or may be suspect as rival-hindering incentives for B2B
exclusivity, will depend largely on the B2B's market share and market power
in relation to smaller rivals. As with any pattern subject to rule of reason
antitrust inquiry, much conduct that is procompetitive for a small start-up
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can turn anticompetitive as the company becomes established and approaches
the ability to wield market power.
Finally, in addition to the foregoing concerns with excluding new
members or hindering rival B2B marketplaces, there is an additional set of
exclusionary concerns: namely, that within the horizontally-owned B2B
itself, the owners may be tempted to operate the B2B in a way that
competitively hinders non-owning competitors who transact business on the
website. This points to the need for rules and practices for the operation of
the B2B (not just for admission to membership) that are uniform, public,
neutral, and grounded in economically defensible criteria. In this
connection, it must be borne in mind that antitrust boundaries are exceeded,
not just by excluding new members in certain circumstances, but by
admitting them on unequal terms, or discriminating against them once
admitted. Such discrimination (which may be subtle and practical, rather
than written into the rules) may raise the rivals' costs of doing business, and
thus cause economic harm to them. An example of such a situation comes
from the airline industry, where computerized reservation systems owned by
certain airlines, but displaying flight information from others as well, favored
flight information for the owner-airlines by displaying it ahead of objectively
"better flights" by non-owner airlines.13
B. B2B Information Sharing
At least since the Supreme Court's decision over thirty years ago in
Container,4 it has been understood that communication between competitors
about current or future prices (or information affecting price) is highly
suspect, because it is but a short step from price-talk to price-fixing or tacit
collusion. It is not surprising, therefore, that a competitor-owned and
operated B2B marketplace would raise information-sharing concerns. On
the other hand, current and accurate information concerning completed
market transactions is essential to the efficient operation of a market.
Depending on its nature, the circumstances, and the structure of the market,
information can be significantly procompetitive or potentially anticompetitive-or both. In particular, a highly concentrated market presents
special risks that competitors who are fully and quickly aware of their
competitors' pricing conduct will engage in tacit collusion.
The discussion earlier of "spillover effects," and suggested steps to
prevent such effects, is applicable here. Independent management, separate
U

In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F.Supp. 1443, 1450, 1474

(C.D. Calif 1988), a~fd, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
14
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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personnel, firewalls between functions and information streams, and clear
rules on what can and cannot be discussed with whom, are all useful ways to
avoid inappropriate information sharing among competitors operating in the
same B2B marketplace.
The most basic protection against competitive information sharing is
probably the most important one: the providing of distinct portals for each
participating seller or buyer to communicate and transact business
confidentially with its respective customers. In addition, care must be taken
to ensure, on the one hand, that B2B owner-participants not have
"privileged" access to certain informationjust among themselves, and on the
other, that equal (appropriate) information access is provided to all web
participants on an equal footing. Competitor knowledge of sales and pricing
information with respect to completed sales is generally procompetitivebut should be available to all.
C. B2B Joint Purchasing
A competitor-owned B2B website is typically operated either for the
purchase of goods (such as inputs for the manufacture of automobiles or
aircraft) or for the sale of goods (such as chemicals or raw materials which are
themselves inputs for downstream manufacturing). An example of the
former is Covisint, a B2B for the purchase of automobile parts owned by
General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Renault, and Nissan. In September
2000 the FTC closed its investigation of Covisint without challenge, but
reserved the right to look again as the joint venture proceeds in actual
operation:
"Because Covisint is in the early stages of its development and has
not yet adopted bylaws, operating rules, or terms for participant
access, because it is not yet operational, and in particular because it
represents such a large share of the automobile market, we cannot
say that implementation of the Covisint venture will not cause
competitive concerns. " "
Joint purchasing arrangements have long been recognized as
fundamentally procompetitive, insofar as they obtain better pricing by
aggregating purchases, permitting suppliers to realize efficiencies and to
reflect those efficiencies in lower prices. These, in turn, lower the cost of

Is

In reCovisint, Inc., File No. 001 0127 (Sept. 11, 2000), closing letter to General Motors Corp.,

Ford Motor Co., and DaimlerChrysler AG.
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downstream production for the buyers and ultimately redound to the benefit
of consumers. 6 For these reasons, buyer-owned and operated B2Bs should
be less competitively sensitive than seller-operated ones. After all, buyers
have a common interest with consumers in driving down the cost of inputs,
which B2B purchasing, with its many efficiencies, will tend to do. Sellers,
on the other hand, are dealing in their final output; they have no further
involvement down the distribution chain. Their interest-not shared by
consumers-is to fetch the highest price for what they are putting on the
website.
All this being true, what is the antitrust problem? Mostly, there is not
one-until the buying group gets big and powerful. The problem arises at
the point where the B2B participants (a) represent a substantial collective
share ofall the purchasing power for the products involved, and (b) aggregate
their purchases, thus acting as a collective entity. When these conditions are
met, monopsony market power may be exercised to drive down the prices by
reducing the collective purchases of the group. This is merely the reverse
(buyer) side of what was discussed earlier as seller-side market power. The
greater the market share ofa group of buyers purchasing as a collective entity,
the greater is its ability (and temptation) to reduce its purchases in order to
cause a price reduction below the competitive level. In the long run,
consumers are not served by such pricing below the competitive level.
This antitrust concern is not raised by a B2B whose participants, in the
aggregate, do not represent a large share of the buying market. Certainly at
20% of the buying market, and probably upwards to twice that figure, there
should be little or no antitrust anxiety. Even above these levels, it is possible
to operate a horizontal buyers' B2B without running into these antitrust
dangers, simply by having the buyers not aggregate their purchases, but rather
negotiating and concluding separate purchasing transactions. This is exactly
what the five automobile manufacturers who own and operate Covisint
stipulated in advance to do. Prudently, they thus reduced considerably the
danger that their jointly owned buyers' B2B would be charged with
exercising monopsony power.

16

Nonetheless, as discussed earlier in regard to B2Bs, exclusionary practices by ajoint purchasing

arrangement with market power can create antitrust difficulties. See, Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). Notwithstanding, the Court
acknowledged that, on the whole, "such cooperative arrangements would seem to be 'designed to increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.'" Id. at 295, citing Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 44 U.S. 1, at20 (1979).
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II.

CONCLUSION

The good news is that in the last 15 years, both courts and enforcement
agencies have come to see that, in most instances, horizontal joint ventures
and other competitor collaborations have overwhelmingly procompetitive
effects. Wise counsel will see to it that such collaborations are structured,
and operated in such a way that the procompetitive benefits will flow, free of
the anticompetitive features that, ifnot recognized and guarded against, could
provoke lawsuits, government challenges, or even criminal indictments.
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APPENDIX A

I. A SUMMARY OF THE ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
17

COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS

Noting that "a perception [among potential collaborators] that antitrust
laws are skeptical about agreements among actual or potential competitors
may deter the development of procompetitive collaborations," the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission and Department ofJustice, Antitrust Division
("the Agencies"), issuedAntitrustGuidelinesforCollaborationsAmongCompetitors
("Guidelines") in April, 2000 to "explain how the Agencies analyze certain
antitrust issues" raised by horizontal joint ventures, strategic alliances and
other competitor collaborations. 8
The Guidelines do not represent the first effort by the Agencies to
provide guidance to the business and legal communities regarding
competitor collaborations. Previous efforts include the Statements ofAntitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care outlining the Agencies' approach to certain
health care collaborations. Additionally, the Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property served to outline the Agencies' enforcement
policy with respect to intellectual property licensing agreements among
competitors. Finally, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as amended in
1997, outline the Agencies' approach to horizontal mergers and acquisitions,
as well as certain competitor collaborations. The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines play a significant role in the Collaboration Guidelines, especially
in terms of market definition, market power, and market concentration
analysis.
A. FundamentalPrinciplesInfluencing the Guidelines, and a Caveat
Section 2 of the Guidelinesserves as the Agencies' acknowledgment of the
procompetitive benefits that competitor collaborations may offer, as well as
the potential anticompetitive harms. While competitors and other businesses
are likely to realize the benefits, especially the efficiencies and boost in ability
to compete with bigger rivals, they may be less sensitive to the harm to
competition and consumers.

17
This Appendix was prepared with the able assistance of Stacie R.Hartman, Esq. andJ. Carlyle
Heam, Esq. of SchiffHardin &Waite, Chicago.
a
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 1,at Preamble.
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Of particular concern is that the line be as clear as possible between the
area of cooperation between competitors and the areas of continuing
competition, and that in the latter areas, the participants retain their pricing
and marketing independence. The Guidelines express a fear that "agreements
may limit independent decision making or combine the control of or
financial interests in production, key assets, or decisions regarding price,
output, or other competitively sensitive variables, or may otherwise reduce
the participants' ability or incentive to compete independently." 9 And of
course, the closeness and communication appropriately engendered by a
legitimate collaboration can also be the occasion for collusion-cooperation
and agreements over subjects and products not within the collaboration.
Thus, firewalls among individuals and functions within the company, to
ensure that .sensitive competitive information will not be shared or even
available, are crucial to minimizing the danger of "spillover" collusive
activity.
In Section 1.3, the Guidelines identify certain competitor collaborations
that will be analyzed, not under the Collaboration Guidelines, but rather
under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
These are horizontal
collaborations in which the agreement eliminates all competition among
participants in the relevant market, and where the collaboration does not
terminate within a sufficiently limited period under the agreement (usually
10 years). 20 This kind of joint venture or strategic alliance is regarded as
sufficiently like a merger in its economic effects as to be treated like one, and
analyzed under the Merger Guidelines.
B. Modes ofAnalysis in the Guidelines
The Guidelines evaluate competitor collaborations under traditional
antitrust principles developed by the courts.
1. Per Se Analysis: Per se illegal agreements are those, like pricefixing, output-restrictions, and horizontal market divisions, which
are conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive, without regard to
whether, in a particular case, there may be procompetitive benefits.
Per se analysis of collaborations is reserved for those that, despite
their form, are actually "covers" for such an illegal agreement.
A horizontal agreement among competitors to fix prices or
restrict output (or to divide markets, which has the same effect) is
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Id. at S 2.2.
Id. at S 1.3.
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called a cartel. Cartels determine, centrally or by prior agreement,
prices, outputs, or the allocation of customers. They offer no
significant prospect of consumer benefit. They are per se illegal
under the antitrust laws and can result in heavy fines and
imprisonment.
2. Rule of Reason Analysis: Rule of reason analysis focuses on the
state of competition in the relevant market, both before and after the
proposed agreement or collaboration. The crux of the analysis is
whether the net effect of the agreement/collaboration is to +harm
competition by increasing market power or facilitating collusion; or
whether it is procompetitive, such as by creating cost-lowering
efficiencies which, in view of continued competition in the market,
will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower costs.
"Efficiency-enhancing integration" is often the key to demonstrating a
procompetitive justification for a collaborative arrangement. The Guidelines
provide that in an efficiency-enhancing integration, participants collaborate
to perform one or more business functions (such as purchasing, R&D,
production, distribution, or marketing) which benefit, or potentially benefit,
consumers by expanding output, reducing price, or enhancing quality,
service, or innovation. Participants in an efficiency-enhancing integration
typically combine, by contract or otherwise, significant capital, technology,
or other complementary assets to achieve procompetitive benefits that
participants could not achieve separately-as well as to compete more
effectively against larger competitors (another procompetitive benefit).
The Agencies will attempt to ascertain the business purpose of an
agreement by taking into account inferences that can be drawn from
objective facts, especially market facts. Additionally, they will consider
evidence of the subjective intent ofthe participants to the extent that it sheds
light on competitive effects. Such evidence of intent may assist in evaluating
market power, the likelihood of anticompetitive harm, and the effect on
particularly where "an agreement's effects are
competition post-agreement,
2
otherwise ambiguous." 1
Section 3.31(a) of the Guidelines focuses on rule of reason analysis of
collaborative agreements that may "limit independent decision making or
combine control or financial interests" of the collaborating companies,
including such agreements pertaining to joint production of goods, joint
marketing, buying collaborations, and R&D ventures.
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Id. at S 3.31, n.35.
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Based on the initial examination as to the nature of the agreement, one
of the following three rule of reason frameworks set forth in the Guidelines
will be applicable to the agreement under review:
1. If the nature of the agreement and the absence of market power
demonstrate the absence of anticompetitive harm, the Agencies
will not challenge the agreement.22
2. "Quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason analysis. If the
likelihood ofanticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of
the agreement, or anticompetitive harm has already occurred,
then a challenge is likely without a detailed market analysis. For
example, the Guidelines cite to FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,23 where the Court condemned - without a detailed
market analysis-an agreement among dentists to withhold xrays from patients' insurers after finding no competitive
justification. Recently, in Calfornia DentalAssociation v. FTC,24
the Supreme Court sought to clarify that "quick look" analysis
should not be viewed as a separate category of rule of reason
analysis. Rather, "the right way to look at 'per se,' 'quick look,'
and 'rule of reason' is... simply as different points along a
spectrum." The Court further said:
[Tihere is generally no categorical line to be drawn
between restraints that give rise to an intuitively
obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those
that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking
to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.
The object is to see whether the experience of the
market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a
confident conclusion about the principal tendency of
a restriction will follow from a quick (or at25 least
quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.
3. "Full blown" rule of reason analysis. If the nature of the
agreement indicates possible competitive concerns, which
cannot be assessed without a detailed market analysis, the
Agencies will analyze the agreement in greater depth. Analyzing

Id. at S3.3.
23
24

FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1986).
California Dental Ass'n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
Id. at 780-81.
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the agreement in greater depth will involve a calculation of
market shares and concentration along with other factors
relevant to the extent to which the participants and the
collaboration have
the ability and incentive to compete
26
independently.
Where the nature of the agreement and market share and market
concentration data reveal a likelihood of competitive harm, the Agencies will
continue their analysis by considering other factors relevant to determining,
then weighing, the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the
collaboration, including the following factors:
1. Exclusivity: To what extent, and in what manner, does the
agreement permit participants to continue to compete 2against.
7
each other and with their joint venture or collaboration?
2. Control Over Assets: Does the agreement require participants to
contribute significant assets to the collaboration that may
prevent, or lessen, the participant from effectively competing in
markets affected by the collaboration?
For example, if
participants in production collaboration must contribute most
of their productive capacity to collaboration, the collaboration
may impair the ability of its participants to remain effective
independent competitors regardless of the terms of the
agreement.28
3. Financial Interests in the Collaborationor Other Participants: The
Agencies will assess each participant's financial interest in the
collaboration and its potential impact on the participant's
incentive to compete independently with the collaboration.
Generally, the greater the financial interest in the collaboration
(in relation to the participant's remaining financial resources and
interests), the less likely the participant will compete with the
collaboration.2
4. Control of the Collaboration's Competitively Significant Decision
Making: Generally, ajoint venture or collaboration is considered
less likely to compete independent of its participants as the
participants themselves exercise greater control over the
venture's price, output, and other competitively significant
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 1, at S3.3.
27

Id.
Id. at S3.34(b).

29

Id. at S34(c).
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decisions. In additionjoint control over the venture's price and
output levels could create or increase market power and raise
competitive concerns.30
5. Likelihood ofAnticompetitive Information Sharing:The Agencies will
evaluate the extent to which competitively sensitive information
concerning markets affected by the collaboration would likely be
disclosed. The concern is collusion and "spillover effects." 3' A
key ingredient is the presence or absence of"firewalls" between
individuals and functions to provide structural safeguards against
improper information sharing, or collusion.
6. Duration of the Collaboration: The duration of the agreement is a
factor in determining whether participants will retain the ability
and incentive to compete against each other now and in the
future. Generally, the
shorter the duration, the better, from an
32
antitrust perspective.
If this examination indicates no potential for anticompetitive harm, the
Agencies end the inquiry. However, if the picture is mixed, with some proand some anticompetitive aspects, the inquiry will go further; specifically, the
Agencies will seek to determine whether the agreement will lead to
procompetitive "cognizable efficiencies."
Cognizable efficiencies that are verifiable, that do not arise from
anticompetitive reductions in output or service, and that cannot be achieved
through means less restrictive than those involved in the collaboration.33
Savings attributable to economies of scale, for example, would be a
cognizable efficiency gain.
C. Safety Zones
The Guidelines have established "safety zones" where anticompetitive
harm is deemed so unlikely to occur that the Agencies presume the
collaboration to be lawful without inquiring further.
Generalsafety zone: Absent compelling circumstances, a collaboration will
not be challenged when the participants' combined market shares going into

30

Id. at S 3.34(d).

31

Id. at S3.34(c).
Id. atS 3.34(f.

32
33
34

Id. at S3.36.

Id.
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the collaboration account for no more than twenty percent (20%) of the
relevant market.3"
R&D safety zone: Generally speaking, bona fide R&D collaborations will
be safe from antitrust challenge where at least three other, independentlycontrolled R&D efforts exist that could serve as a substitute for the
collaborative R&D activity in question.36

35
36

Id. at § 4.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 54.3.
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APPENDIX B:
37
1. ANTITRUST TREATMENT OFJOINT VENTURES UNDER EU LAW

European Union (EU) competition law is concerned with
"undertakings" 31 in the public and private sectors of European society. EU
competition policy is established by the European Commission, which is
empowered to render decisions on whether certain commercial
arrangements will create or strengthen a dominant position for the entities
under consideration, thus impeding effective competition.
EU competition law addresses joint ventures and strategic alliances
primarily under: 1) the EC Merger Control Regulation ("the Merger
Regulation") and 2) Article 81 of the EC Treaty ("Article 81" or "the
Treaty"). With respect to Article 81, the Commission is empowered to
"ensure the application of the principles" ofArticle 81 by investigating, on its
own initiative or by application of a Member State, any suspected violation.
Which of these provisions will govern a commercial arrangement depends
largely on the specific character of the arrangement.
A. Joint Ventures and StrategicAlliances: General Characteristics

1. JOINT VENTURES

EU competition law recognizes several classifications ofjoint ventures,
depending on specific characteristics of the joint venture. The classification
of the joint venture will dictate both its procedural and substantive legal
treatment.
a)

Concentrative 'full-function" joint ventures: Joint ventures that
perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity. Typically, such a venture is a separate
corporate entity from its parents/co-venturers, and has sufficient
management, finance, staff, and other resources to conduct
business on a long-term basis. These are often referred to as

This Appendix was prepared with the able assistance of Manotti L. Jenkins, Esq. of Schiff
Hardin & Waite, Chicago.
38
An "undertaking" is a broad concept under EU competition law. It applies to any collection
of resources for economic purposes, including a company, partnership, a proprietorship, or an association.
37
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"merger-type"joint ventures that have a community dimension,
because their "turnovers" 39 exceed certain thresholds established
under the relevant provision.
b) Cooperative 'full-function" joint ventures: Joint ventures which
perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity, but do not have a "Community dimension;" i.e.,
their turnovers do not exceed the established thresholds.
c) Cooperative "partial-function"joint ventures: Joint ventures that
perform only limited, specific functions (e.g., research &
development, production,joint distribution, orjoint purchasing
activities for their parents) and have no access to a market. Also,
joint ventures which are established for a short duration, e.g.,
those designed to construct a specific project, will be classified
under this heading, because they are considered as not operating
on a lasting basis. Thesejoint ventures will be treated as merely
auxiliary to their parents. These may or may not have a
community dimension.
2. STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
EU competition law recognizes a strategic alliance as a form of
cooperation between firms-commonly with competing or complementary
skills-which do not establish a separate business entity. Strategic alliances
provide for a legally structured framework designed to promote synergy and
closer cooperation for technical, operational and/or commercial means.
As cooperative arrangements, strategic alliances can be of varying scope.
They usually involve the creation of several contractual or structural links,
e.g., the creation of a "contractual" joint venture, specializing in certain
markets, joint R&D, technology transfer, cross-supply arrangements,
commitments to cooperate in other fields in the future, and the acquisition
of shareholdings.
Generally, strategic alliances are limited to a specific field of the parties'
activities, such as the development and introduction of new technology, or
cooperation on the frequency and modalities of services (as in airline flights
or telecommunication services). Strategic alliances are generally forged
between actual competitors and often aim at initiating a new form of
competition with other, similar alliances in response to the growing
integration of markets. In particular, strategic alliances often surface in EU

3
"Turnover" is the amount of business done by an undertaking or group of undertakings,
measured in the European Community by ECUs.
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markets that have been liberalized, such as air transport and telecommunications.
The primary competitive concern with both joint ventures and strategic
alliances is ensuring independence and effective competition between the
otherwise competing companies, so that the procompetitive benefits of the
alliance can be realized without the anticompetitive costs of cartel behavior.
B. Applicable EU Competition Law
1. THE MERGER REGULATION
The Merger Regulation applies to concentrativefull-functionjoint ventures
("merger-type"joint ventures) above a certain size.' The Commission must
be notified with seven days of a binding agreement, but before implementation, in such a venture("mandatory notification"). The information required
in the notification is substantial and takes considerable time to prepare;
certain Commission best-practice guidelines suggest "informal meetings"
one to two weeks in advance of notification. The joint venture cannot go
forward until the Commission approves.
The initial investigation period is one month, or six weeks under certain
circumstances (e.g., when the parties offer commitments to the Commission
in response to any competitive concerns); ifthe proposed deal raises danger
flags to the Commission, the Commission may decide to initiate an
investigation which could last up to an additional four months.
Substantively, the Merger Regulation assesses joint ventures falling
under its ambit to determine: 1) whether the joint venture creates or
strengthens a dominant position which could result in the significant
impeding of effective competition; 4' and 2) ifthe parties are competitors with
each other or with the joint venture in markets related to the joint venture's
business, whether the joint venture will result in collusion in those related
markets.42

40
See generally, Merger Guidelines, supra note 4. Article 1 contains rather elaborate size
requirements, based on sales or "turnover" thresholds. Basically, the Merger Regulation applies to "all
concentrations with a Community dimension," meaning an aggregate worldwide turnover of more than
ECU 5,000 million (5 billion), and an aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings of more than ECU 250 million. However, there are various carve-outs, and an alternative
test as well, so the technical definitions must be carefully consulted. Even "turnover" has a technical
definition, which appears in Article 5.
41
Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at Article 2(1).
Id. at Article 2(4).
42
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A summary of the recent EU treatment of the joint venture between
British Telephone ("BT") and AT&T is illustrative of several aspects of
antitrustjoint venture analysis in Europe. On March 30, 1999, the Commission conditionally approved the operation of a concentrative full-function
joint venture, owned 50-50 by BT (the fifth largest telecommunications
operator worldwide by turnover) and AT&T (the second largest). The joint
venture would provide a broad range of advanced global telecommunications
services to multinational corporate customers and international carrier
services to other carriers.
The Commission analyzed the joint venture as it affected four different
markets: global telecommunications services, international carrier services,
international voice telephony services on the UK-US route, and certain UK
services.
a) Global communications. The Commission investigated whether
there were any bottlenecks that would constitute barriers to entry for
new entrants or whether the joint venture would benefit from
unmatchable advantages; also, whether BT's current strong position
on the local loop in the UK, and the possibilities of thejoint venture
locking in customers by the API facilities, would create a dominant,
competition impeding position in the common market. The
Commission concluded that both competitors and customers would
react swiftly to price increases, so that such increases above the
competitive level would not be profitable for the joint venture.
b) International carrier services. Following an investigation, the
Commission concluded that the joint venture would not lead to the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the area of
international carrier services. The Commission based its conclusion
on the fact that competition is strong and will be at least as strong
after the venture as before: new competitors have entered the
market, volumes of international traffic carried by these parties is
matched by volumes carried by remaining competitors, there is no
lack of capacity either in the EU or on transatlantic routes, and the
cost of capacity is decreasing rapidly.
c) International voice telephony services on the UK-US route. Although the capacity owned by the joint venture on all transatlantic
cables would be less than 20% in 2000, it appeared to the Commission that the joint venture would account for approximately half of
the two-way traffic between the US and the UK. Thus, the
Commission conducted a more thorough investigation. The
Commission determined, based on the follow-up investigation, that
the joint venture would not be able either to raise its competitors'
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costs or to act independently from its competitors and customers.
The Commission based this conclusion on the facts that numerous
facilities-based operators are authorized to operate on the US-UK
route, several operators have already started to own end-to-end
capacity, and because of the availability of excess capacity at rapidly
decreasing costs.
d) Certain UK services. The Commission investigated the
possibility that creation of the joint venture would strengthen BT's
dominant position on certain UK markets for telecommunications
services. The Commission found that the current and future
regulatory regime to be applied by the UK telecommunications
regulator would prevent BT from adopting such behavior.

2. ARTICLE 81 OF THE TREATY
Article 81 applies tojoint ventures that are not merger-type ventures, i.e.,
to cooperativefull-functionjoint ventures, cooperative partial-functionjoint ventures,
and strategic alliances. Notification to the Commission is not required (but
may be prudent), and if approval is sought, there is no need to suspend the
venture or strategic alliance pending approval. However, the Commission
decision-making process tends to take longer under Article 81.
If the arrangement is likely to be challenged as restrictive of competition,
it might be wise to consider applying for an exemption. Article 81(3) allows
for exemptions of arrangements if certain beneficial characteristics are
shown, e.g., increased efficiency in the production or distribution of goods,
ensuring that a fair share of the benefits are passed on to consumers, avoiding
restrictions which are not indispensable for achieving benefits, and providing
safeguards against collusion or joint activity that may reduce or eliminate
competition. Strategic alliances often obtain exemptions because of their
efficiency-enhancing effects, enabling the parties to compete more effectively
with other alliances or larger companies, particularly where the line between
spheres of cooperation and noncooperation is clearly drawn.
In contrast to the approval under the Merger Regulation, any exemption
under Article 81(3) would be for a limited time, after which the arrangement
would be re-assessed. Absent an exemption, an arrangement found to be
anticompetitive may be voided, private parties harmed by the agreement may
sue in court, and the Commission may impose fines.
Substantively, the Commission will consider whether the arrangement
will have an appreciable anticompetitive effect. To grant-an exemption, the
Commission must conclude that the beneficial effects of the arrangement
under consideration outweigh its anticompetitive impact.
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Let us consider, for illustrative purposes, a significant recent decision by
the Commission under Article 81 of the Treaty, namely, the strategic alliance
among Lufthansa Airlines, SAS, and United Airlines. In August 1996, these
three airlines concluded a coordination agreement aimed at establishing a
worldwide alliance, including code-sharing and other cooperative arrangements aimed at facilitating intercompany access by international passengers.
This followed two bilateral agreements, one between Lufthansa and United
(concluded on January 9, 1996) and one between SAS and United (concluded on June 28, 1996). The Commission, on July 3, 1996, decided to
initiate separate proceedings aimed at each of the bilateral agreements. On
September 18, 1996, the Commission initiated the same proceedings with
respect to the coordination among all three airlines. The Commission
preliminarily concluded that the agreements violated Article 81, then it
issued a proposal outlining its analysis and setting out appropriate measures
to alleviate the violation. The Commission analyzed the agreements only in
connection with the transport of passengers.
The Commission's conditions for approval of the alliance included the
following:
a) The members of the alliance were required to reduce their
combined flight frequencies, upon competitor request, under
certain conditions.
b) The members of the alliance were required to make slots
available to airlines authorized to provide services between
Frankfurt or Copenhagen and the United States, on request,
with certain conditions. The slots were to be made available in
Frankfurt or Copenhagen.
c) Lufthansa was required to terminate its code-sharing agreement
with Lauda Air on the Vienna-Munich-Miami route.
d) The members were given two options regarding their frequent
flyer programs ("FFPs"): either (1) refrain from pooling their
FFPs in connection with travel between Germany and Scandinavia, respectively, and the United States, and refrain from
allowing passengers to transfer program points obtained in the
FFP of one member of the alliance to that of another member;
or (2) allow airlines without comparable FFPs to participate in
the joint FFP of the alliance, while preserving confidentiality of
transferred data.
e) The alliance was required to ensure that its joint policy toward
travel agents established or providing services in Germany not
include a system of remuneration that has the object or effect of
securing the loyalty of travel agents to the members of the
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alliance in the relevant markets. In addition, the terms of fares
offered to large customers established or buying transport
services in Germany should be linked to annual turnover in the
relevant markets, without a system ofthresholds or a system that
directly or indirectly rewards loyalty.
0 Any airline established in a European member country or in the
United States, which operates services on one or more of the
relevant routes, should be entitled to ask for an interlining
agreement with the members of the alliance. The members
were required to conclude the agreement on the terms usual in
the industry.
g) The Member States of the EU (plus Norway) were required to
authorize any established carrier in the European Community
to operate direct and indirect services between any airport in
their territory and the United States. The U.S. authorities were
required to authorize the operation of those flights to an extent
sufficient to ensure that the alliance cannot eliminate competition in a substantial portion of the relevant markets.

